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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Newly discovered fingerprint evidence, which indicates that
fingerprints found on a shoe box handled by the suspect
immediately prior to the crime do not match the fingerprints of
Appellant Michael Ray Anderson [uMr. Anderson"] , renders

xx

"a

different result probable on the retrial of this case.'" State v.
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994)(citation omitted). The
State's argument that the evidence is not reliable due to
contamination is not supported by the record, which does not
establish that the evidence was contaminated or otherwise
invalidated. Additionally, because the sole identification of Mr.
Anderson was eyewitness testimony, the objective evidence of
fingerprints creates a probability that a "reasonable jury would
have had a reasonable doubt" concerning the identity of Mr.
Anderson as the suspect. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah
1991) .
Mr. Anderson's conviction was based upon erroneous jury

instructions which allowed a conviction for the robbery of
Mervyns, a non-natural person. Although the State points out that
Mervyns is defined as a "person" under section 76-1-601(8) of the
Utah Criminal Code, that definition does not apply. Mr. Anderson
was convicted under section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the robbery
statute, and that section does not use the term "person" to
describe the victim, but to describe where "personal property"
must be taken from to constitute robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6301(1) (a) (1999) . Because "personal property" cannot be taken from
the "person" of Mervyns, the jury instructions allowing a
conviction for the robbery of Mervyns was error.
Finally, sufficient evidence of the element of "force or
fear" was not established at trial, and the trial court erred in
denying Mr. Anderson's motion for a directed verdict. Section 766-301(1)(a) did not modify the common law definition of the
element of "force or fear," and under that definition "force or
fear" cannot be established by force or threatened force used to
facilitate escape or to retain property. Although other sections
of the robbery statute specifically modified the common law
element of "force or fear" to allow for this, section 76-6301(1)(a) did not, and the evidence was not sufficient to
establish Mr. Anderson's conviction under that section.
Therefore, Mr. Anderson's conviction should be reversed and this
2

case should be remanded for a new trial.

ARGUMENT
I. THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT THE FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS DOES
NOT RENDER A DIFFERENT RESULT PROBABLE UPON RETRIAL IS NOT
SUPPORTABLE WHERE THE FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS WAS NOT
INVALIDATED ON THE RECORD AND THERE WAS NO OBJECTIVE SUPPORT
OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF MR. ANDERSON AS THE SUSPECT
Before addressing the State's argument, it is helpful to
further explore the standard of review applicable to the issue of
newly discovered evidence.1 The correct standard of review is the
"abuse of discretion" standard. State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11 ^[16,
994 P.2d 1237 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah
1991)). "A trial court has a wide range of discretion in
determining whether newly discovered evidence entitles a litigant
to a new trial." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah

1

The application of the "abuse of discretion" standard can
vary depending upon the issue on review. For instance, in
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of
prior crimes or bad acts of the defendant, the reviewing court
determines whether the admission was ""scrupulously examined'" by
the trial judge. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 fl6, 6 P.3d
1120 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 47 fl8, 993 P.2d 837).
However, in determining the admissibility of expert testimony,
trial courts have ""wide discretion.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d
337, 340 (Utah 1997) . With regard to the review of factual
findings on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, trial
courts are given a "high level" of discretion. State v.
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(citation
omitted).

3

1994) .2 This discretion is abused when the failure to grant a new
trial "is [not] within the limits of reasonability." Id.
Specifically, ""[t]o justify a new trial, newly discovered
evidence should clarify a fact that was contested and resolved
against the movant, or be sufficiently persuasive that the result
of the trial might be changed." Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (quoting
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988)).3
In this case, newly discovered fingerprint evidence
2

The "abuse of discretion" standard used in reviewing
motions for new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence
has been described as allowing for a ""wide range of
discretion.'" James, 819 P.2d at 793 (citation omitted). However,
the standard has also been described as requiring a ""clear
abuse'" of discretion before a new trial can be granted. State v.
Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(citation
omitted); see also State v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1972).
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that the decision to grant
a new trial in the context of newly discovered evidence rests
within the "sound discretion" of the trial court. State v.
Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 1942); see also State v. Hawkins,
16 P.2d 713, 719 (Utah 1932)(citation omitted).
3

See also Goddard, 871 P.2d at 545 ("Also, newly discovered
evidence should clarify a fact that was contested and resolved
against the movant."); James, 819 P.2d at 795 (The trial court
abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial where new
evidence of a principal witness's perjury gave rise to the
probability that a reasonable jury would have had reasonable
doubt whether the defendant had the requisite intent); Jiron, 4 92
P.2d at 985 ("This court will deem the denial of [a motion for a
new trial] an abuse of discretion only in such instances where
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have been miscarried
because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the
new evidence will supply . . . " ) ; and State v. Weaver, 6 P.2d
167, 169-70 (Utah 1931) (The sound discretion of trial court was
not abused when "[t]he facts to which Ross offers to testify were
actually before the jury.").

4

clarifies that Mr. Anderson was mistakenly identified as the
suspect who threatened Mervyns employees with a knife. In his
testimony at trial, Detective Doug McGrath ["Detective McGrath"]
testified that when he was assigned this case, u[t]here [were]
several little things in there that made me feel that this was a
fairly serious offense and that it required a lot of follow-up on
it to try to determine who the suspect is." R. 478-79. Yet, he
did not visit Mervyns until four days later, when he picked up
the video tape. R. 4 94. He did not pick up the shoe box with the
suspect's old shoes from Mervyns until five days after being
assigned the case. Id. Additionally, the evidence technician
collected no evidence at the scene. R. 493-94, R. 500-01, R. 505.
The sole basis for identification of Mr. Anderson as the
suspect was the report of Mr. Sam Gonzales, who saw the Mervyns
video tape on Fox 13 News, R. 480-81, R. 514-15, and subsequent
photo spread identifications by two of the three Mervyns
employees who witnessed the incident.4 R. 486-87.

Detective

McGrath testified that the purpose of fingerprinting is to
confirm the identification of a suspect, R. 488, but the shoe box
handled by the suspect was not analyzed for fingerprints until

4

One employee, Elizabeth Ashdown, who
for some time on the video camera prior to
left the store, was unable to identify Mr.
suspect from the photo line up. R. 397-98,

5

observed the suspect
approaching him as he
Anderson as the
R. 416.

after Mr. Anderson's trial. R. 487, R. 674 [1-2]. The analysis
indicates that the shoe box "was examined and found to have been
processed by Ninhydrin. Some latent fingerprints were visible. .
. . The latents developed on the box were compared with the
fingerprints on file in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Crime lab
for ANDERSON, Michael Ray S0# 0213957. . . . No match was
found."5
The State explains that "[t]he absence of a match must be
considered in its relevant evidentiary context." Appellee's Br.
13. Because the box was in an open area of the store and handled
by store employees, Detective McGrath was concerned about
contamination. R. 488. The State asserts that "[u]nder such
circumstances, the fact that the one surviving fingerprint on the
box did not belong to defendant does nothing to either implicate
or exonerate him from participation in this crime. The most that
can be gleaned from the evidence is that the solitary 'almost
complete' print on the box did not belong to defendant."

5

The faxed fingerprint analysis, dated 11 February 2000, is
marked "State's Exhibit S-1" attached to "Defendants Motion for a
New Trial" and has been properly included with the record. The
analysis was included in accordance with Mr. Anderson's
"Supplemental Designation of Record" filed 14 March 2000, which
requested the attachment of "all documents contained in the file
in the above-related matter together with the transcript of [the
hearing on 11 February 2000 for a motion for a new trial]." R.
692-93.

6

Appellee's Br. 13.
The record does not support these assertions. While
Detective McGrath did indicate there was a possibility of
contamination, R. 488, he did not express the opinion that
contamination invalidated any fingerprint analysis that could be
conducted. See R. 488, R. 509. Indeed, he was not qualified to
express such an opinion. R. 503. The fingerprint analysis
conducted after the trial indicates that there was not one, but
"some latent fingerprints"6 on the box, and none of these
belonged to Mr. Anderson.7 The trial court made a finding of fact
reflecting this. R. 687. There is nothing to support the
assertion that this does not "exonerate him from participation in
this crime." Appellee's Br. 13. Additionally, even if evidence of
contamination had been presented, this would go to the weight of
evidence, and would not be a basis for exclusion of the
evidence.8
6

State's Exhibit S-l attached to "Defendant's Motion for a
New Trial." R. 213.
7

The fingerprints were not matched with store employees or
any other person because no attempt was made to do so. R. 674 [23] .
8

See State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (u[I]t is within the province of the jury to judge the
credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and
reject these alternate hypothesis."); State v. Schreuder, 712
P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1985)(". . . the general rule being that
uncertainty on the part of an expert goes to weight rather than

7

On its face, the new fingerprint evidence gives rise to a
grave suspicion "that justice may have been miscarried because of
the lack of enlightenment" on the issue of the identification of
Mr. Anderson as the suspect in this case. Jiron, 492 P.2d at 985.
Mr. Anderson was identified solely on the basis of eyewitness
testimony, R. 480-81, R. 486-87, R. 514-15, without any objective
evidence to corroborate his identification. The fingerprint
analysis is crucial to the clarification of this point.
However, for this Court to reverse Mr. Anderson's conviction
and remand this case for a new trial, new evidence must not only
w

"clarify a fact that was contested and resolved against the

movant,'" Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (citation omitted), but also a
three-prong test must be met. The State does not contest Mr.
Anderson's assertion that the second prong of the test has been
met. Appellee's Br. 11-12 n.4. Additionally, the State argues
that it is immaterial whether the first prong is met9 because the
third prong of the test is dispositive. Appellee's Br. 11-12 n.4.
The third prong is that the new evidence ""must be such as
to render a different result probable on the retrial of the

to admissibility.")
9

The first two prongs require that the proffered evidence
"(i) [] could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
discovered and produced at trial; (ii) it is not merely
cumulative . . . .'" Loose, 2000 UT 11 ^16 (citation omitted).
xx

8

case.'" Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994)(citation omitted).
"When 'new' evidence merely tends to impeach or discredit the
testimony of a witness [] a new trial need not be granted."
Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (citing Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851). But
where the new evidence creates a probability that a "reasonable
jury would have had a reasonable doubt" as to a crucial element
of the case, even though there may be sufficient evidence to
support a conviction, a new trial should be granted. James, 819
P.2d at 795.10
Here the fingerprint analysis does not merely tend to
impeach the testimony of a witness, it casts "reasonable doubt"
upon the identification of Mr. Anderson as the suspect who
threatened Mervyns employees with a knife. At trial, Detective
McGrath described how Mr. Anderson was identified. " [A] s I looked
at the video [from Mervyns], the portion of it where the suspect
turns and faces the camera before he goes out the door, I looked
at it and I thought, well, gee, if somebody knew who that guy
was, if they seen that portion of the tape, they would be able to
say who it is. Maybe myself or the store clerks think it looks

10

See also Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125 ("Where disinterested
testimony on the vital point in a case is very scant, newly
discovered testimony on that point appearing from affidavits in
support of the motion for a new trial to be apparently reliable .
. . and it appears likely that such evidence would change the
result, a new trial should be granted.").

9

funny, but to me, if I knew that person prior to the incident I
would be able to say, yeah, I know who that is." R. 479. The
eyewitness identification was made after the video tape was aired
over Fox 13 News. R. 480-81, R. 514-15, R. 486-87.
Eyewitness identification of a suspect is subjective and
open for mistake,11 and the identification of Mr. Anderson is not
corroborated by any other evidence. Additionally, as Detective
McGrath testified, the case ''required a lot of follow-up on it to
try to determine who the suspect is," R. 479, and the video made
the suspect "look[] funny" to those unfamiliar with him. R. 479.
Under these circumstances, the eyewitness identification of Mr.
Anderson as the suspect is subject to reasonable doubt in light
of the fingerprint analysis, which could not match Mr. Anderson's
fingerprints with any of those on the box. Therefore, the new
fingerprint evidence renders ""a different result probable on the
retrial of the case.'" Goddard, 871 P.2d at 545 (citation
omitted).

11

The potential for inaccuracy in eyewitness identification
is discussed in Aplt. Br. 23-24.
10

II. UNDER THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THE
DEFINITION OF "PERSON" RELIED UPON BY THE STATE IS NOT
APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE TERM "PERSON" IS NOT USED IN THE
CONTEXT OF DESCRIBING THE VICTIM, IT IS USED TO DESCRIBE
WHERE "PERSONAL PROPERTY" MUST BE TAKEN FROM TO CONSTITUTE A
SECTION 76-6-301 (1) (a) ROBBERY
Mr. Anderson's conviction was based upon erroneous jury
instructions which inaccurately characterized the elements of
robbery under section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the Utah Criminal Code.
In particular, the jury was improperly instructed on the elements
of: "person, or immediate presence" and "against [the victim's]
will." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1)(a).12 These elements
contemplate that the victim of robbery is a natural person. See
Aplt Br. 30-32. However, the jury instructions indicated that
these elements included a taking of "personal property then in
the possession of Mervyns from the person or immediate presence
of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns"
if such taking was "against the will of Sharlotte Billings, Ann
Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns . . ." R. 173. See Aplt. Br.
28-30. Because these instructions allowed for the conviction of
Mr. Anderson based upon the characterization of Mervyns as the
victim, these instructions are erroneous.

12

Section 76-6-301(1) indicates that "[a] person commits
robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or
attempts to take personal property in the possession of another
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means of force or fear . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1999).

11

The State replies that these instructions were proper in
light of the definition of "person" in the Utah Criminal Code.
Appellee Br, 16. That definition states that u"[p]erson' means an
individual, public or private corporation, government,
partnership, or unincorporated association." Utah Code Ann. § 761-601(8) (1999) . See Appellee Br. 16.
To determine whether this definition applies to section 766-301(1)(a), we must apply the rules of statutory construction.13
We begin by "examining the plain language of the applicable
statutes and apply other methods of statutory interpretation only
when the language is either ambiguous or inconsistent." State v.
Westerman, 945 P.2d at 696.14 In examining the plain language,
"it is a 'fundamental principal of statutory construction (and .
. . of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in
which it is used.'" Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313 (citation omitted). 15

13

The correct standard of review on the issue of statutory
construction is a review for correctness. When a "trial court's
order is premised on statutory interpretation, as it is here, we
afford the trial court's interpretation no deference and review
for correctness." State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
14

See also State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995);
State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
15

See also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,
1045 (Utah 1991) ("[A] statute should not be construed in a

12

Further, "statutory provisions should be construed to give full
effect to all their terms." State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845
(Utah 1992).
Taken in its entire context, with full effect given to all
its terms, section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the robbery statute
contemplates that the victim is natural person and the statutory
definition relied upon by the State does not apply. Section 76-6301(1) (a) does not use the term "person" in the context of
defining who the victim must be. The victim is not described as a
"person" but as "another." The only time the word "person" is
used is when the statute describes where the personal property
must be taken from.

The statute indicates that robbery is

committed if the robber takes "personal property in the
possession of another from his

person,

or immediate presence."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a) (emphasis added) . Thus, the
"person" or "immediate presence" is where the personal property
must be taken from, and

"another" is who the property must be

taken from. This reading is the "plain language" reading of the
statute, see Westermanf 945 P.2d at 696, and accords with the
statute's natural sentence structure and the context of the
words. See Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313.

piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole").
13

Further, if the statute was interpreted to mean that
"person, or immediate presence" described the victim rather than
where "personal property" must be taken from, full effect would
not be given to all of the terms of the statute. See Vigil, 842
P.2d at 845. The term "another" would become superfluous.
"'Whenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no
portion is superfluous,' and, as such they should not be read to
include a pure redundancy." State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277,
278 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Beynon v. St. George-Dixie
Lodge # 1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n.21 (Utah 1993)).
Additionally, the words "person, or immediate presence" if
interpreted as describing the victim, would take on a generalized
meaning as described in the definition of "person" cited by the
State. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(8) (1999) . In the plain
language and context of the statute, however, the word "person"
takes on the more specific meaning of the human body.16 As
indicated in Wharton's Criminal Law, " [i]t is largely selfevident when property is taken "from the person' of another." 4
Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 458 (15th ed. 1996).

One of the definitions of "person" in Merriam Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary is "b: the body of a human being; also:
the
body and clothing <unlawful search of the ~> . . . ." MerriamWebster, Incorporated, Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at
867 (10th ed. 1997) .

14

This specific meaning of "person" applies instead of the
statutory definition of "person" located in section 76-1-601(8)
because "specific statutory provisions take precedence over
general statutory provisions." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 845.
The jury was given incorrect instructions in this case
because the instructions described the possessor of the "personal
property" as Mervyns, a non-natural person. R. 173. This
contradicts the plain meaning of the statute, which uses the term
"another," to describe the victim of a section 76-6-301(1) (a)
robbery. "Another" necessarily refers to a natural person because
"personal property in the possession of another" cannot be taken
from the "person" of a corporation, business entity, or any other
non-natural person. See Wharton's Criminal Law § 458 (15th ed.
1996) .
Additionally, the jury instructions incorrectly indicated
that the elements of a section 76-6-301(1) (a) robbery included
taking "from the person or immediate presence of Sharlotte
Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns" if such taking
was "against the will of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth
Ashdown of Mervyns . . ." R. 173. Although, as the state points
out, these employees "were acting within the scope of their
employment" when they were threatened with a knife, Appellee Br.
17, the victim of a section 76-6-301(1) (a) robbery must be a
15

natural person. Because Mervyns is not a natural person, this
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See State
v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991).

III. BECAUSE THE ELEMENT OF "FORCE OR FEAR" REQUIRED TO
ESTABLISH ROBBERY AT COMMON LAW DID NOT INCLUDE FORCE OR
THREATENED FORCE USED TO FACILITATE ESCAPE OR RETAIN
PROPERTY, AND THE COMMON LAW WAS NOT MODIFIED BY SECTION 766-301(1) (a) , SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS NOT PRESENTED WHERE
EMPLOYEES WERE THREATENED AFTER THE SUSPECT LEFT THE STORE
Because the evidence, fully marshaled, is not sufficient to
establish aggravated robbery under sections 76-6-301(1) (a) and
76-6-302(1) of the Utah Criminal Code, the trial court erred in
denying Mr. Anderson's motion for a directed verdict based upon
insufficient evidence. See Aplt. Br. 35-39. The State counters
that the denial was not error because Utah has adopted the
"transaction" approach to the crime of robbery, and sufficient
evidence was presented to convict Mr. Anderson under this
approach. Appellee Br. 19-24. In its argument, the State relies
upon D.B. v. State, which held that "if force or fear is used at
any time prior to or concurrent with the victim actually losing
the ability to control his chattel, then a robbery has occurred."
D.B., 925 P.2d at 182 (footnote omitted). See Appellee Br. 21-24.
However, as this Court stated in D.B. v. State, that case
was one uof first impression in Utah and quite probably one of

16

last impression as the Utah Legislature amended the robbery
statute in 1995 shortly after the incident in this case took
place." D.B., 925 P.2d at 180. The State argues that the
alteration of the statute is immaterial. Appellee Br. 22-23. The
State points out that the defendant in D.B. v. State had argued
that the amendment of the statute indicated the previous version
Mid not encompass a transactional approach to robbery," D.B.,
925 P.2d at 181, and that argument was rejected by this Court.
Appellee Br. 23.
Under the rules of statutory interpretation, the holding in
D.B. v. State does not apply.17 The Utah Code indicates that this
State has adopted "[t]he common law of England so far as it was
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or laws
of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this state .
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1999). However, the "provisions
and all proceedings under" our state statutes "are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the
statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance

17

Additionally, since the amendment of the robbery statute,
D.B. v. State has not been followed. D.B. v. State has been
mentioned in two cases, State v. Hollen, 1999 Ut. App. 123 ^f 10
n.2, 982 P.2d 90, in which the issue of a "completed taking" was
not reached, and State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), which cited D.B. for principals of general statutory
interpretation.

17

between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in
reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail."
Utah Code Arm. § 68-3-2 (1999). The Utah Supreme Court has
likewise indicated that "where a conflict arises between the
common law and a statute or constitutional law, the common law
must yield." Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332,
1337 (Utah 1982). On the other hand,

xx

[s]tatutes are not to be

construed as effecting change in the common law beyond that which
is clearly indicated," Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244, 248 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987), and when the common law is consistent with
statutory construction, it applies. Debridge v. Mutual Protective
Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 793-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).18
An examination of the common law reveals that the use of
force or intimidation in escape, or in retaining personal
property taken from another, does not supply the element of
"force or fear" necessary for robbery. Robbery, 76 Am. Jur. 2d §
28. Specifically,

xx

[a] t common law, and in some states, force or

threatened force (putting a victim in fear of injury) amounts to
robbery only if it is used to 'take' property from the possession
of another. Force or threatened force used thereafter, in order

18

See also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,
1045 (Utah 1991) ("It is also proper in construing a statute
which deals with tort claims to interpret the statute in accord
with relevant tort law.")

18

to retain possession of the property taken or to facilitate
escape, does not qualify. At best, in such a case, the separate
offenses of larceny and assault or larceny and battery are
committed." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 4 63
(15th ed. 1996)(Footnotes omitted). However, the element of force
or fear can be extended by statute to include the use of force or
threatened force "to 'retain' possession of the property." Id.,
see also Robbery, 76 Am. Jur. 2d § 28.
The common law element of "force or fear" was not extended
by section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the Utah Criminal Code. That section
indicates that robbery is committed if "the person unlawfully and
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, by means of force or fear . . . ." Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-301(1) (a) (1999). The plain language19 of the statute
indicates that, to constitute robbery, the robber must "take . .
. by means of force or fear . . . ." There is no qualifying or
extending language in the statute to indicate that the
legislature intended20 to extend the common law element of "force

19

Statutory interpretation always begins "by examining the
plain language of the applicable statutes . . . ." State v.
Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
20

"Our primary aim is to ascertain and effectuate the
Legislature's intent." State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah
19

or fear" by including force or threatened force to retain
property or facilitate escape. Often, robbery statutes which
extend the element of "force or fear" do so by the use of
language such as

xx

in the course of,"21 "in perpetration,"22 or "to

'carry away.'"23 In the absence of qualifying or extending
language, the rules of statutory interpretation require the
application of the common law. Therefore, the element of "force
or fear" required by section 76-6-301(1)(a) does not include
force or threatened force used to escape or retain possession of
property.
Part of the current robbery statute specifically allows for
the conviction of defendants under the "transaction" theory of
robbery advocated by the State. See Appellee Br. 19. Section 766-301(1) (b) allows for the conviction of defendants who use
"force or fear of immediate force against another in the course
of committing a theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (b) . "Course
of committing a theft" is defined as "an attempt to commit theft,
1995) (citation omitted) .
21

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2) (1999) .

22

Robbery, 67 Am. Jur. 2d § 28.

23

4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 463 (15th ed.
1996)(Citing statutes from Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Minnesotta, New Hampshire, New York, Washington,
and the Model Penal Code. Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6301 (2) is cited) .
20

commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2). This clearly
modifies the common law element of "force or fear," which did not
allow for a robbery conviction if force or threat of force was
used solely to facilitate escape or retain the property.
However, such a modification is not indicated in section 766-301(1)(a), which is at issue here. On its face, and applying
the "plain reading" analysis, the lack of a specific modification
of the common law rule in section 76-6-301(1) (a) indicates that
this section applies only to those situations in which a robber
takes personal property from a natural person by means of "'any
physical act directed against a person as a means of gaining
control of property.'" 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal
Law § 460 (15th ed. 1996)(Footnote omitted). This is entirely
consistent with common law robbery which, by definition, is
classified "not only as an offense against property but also as
an offense against the person." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's
Criminal Law § 454 (15th ed. 1996) (Footnote omitted) . In this
case, sufficient evidence of "force or fear" used concurrently
with the taking of personal property, as required by section 766-301(1)(a), was not presented.
Because sufficient evidence of the element of "force or
fear" was not established at trial, see Aplt. Br. 35-39, the
21

trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Anderson's motion for a
directed verdict. This Court reverses u"a jury verdict only when,
after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in
a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that "the evidence
to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight
and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust.'w/ State v. Rudolph, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 155 ^22, 3 P.3d
192 (citing State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, Kl9, 999 P.2d 565
(citation omitted)). Here, there was no evidence of the required
element of "force or fear" because no threat occurred until the
suspect was making his escape. See Aplt. Br. 35-36. Therefore,
Mr. Anderson is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a
remand for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests a reversal of his
conviction and a remand for a new trial on the basis of the posttrial fingerprint analysis performed on the shoe box handled by
the suspect. The analysis could not match Mr. Anderson's
fingerprints with any of those on the box, and this new evidence
renders ""a different result probable on the retrial of the
case.'" State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (citation
omitted). Additionally, the jury was incorrectly instructed on
22

the elements of robbery under section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the Utah
Criminal Code because the instructions erroneously contemplated
that the victim of a 76-6-301(1)(a) robbery could be a nonnatural person. This error should be remedied by a reversal of
Mr. Anderson's conviction and remand for a new trial. See State
v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) . Finally, because no
evidence of the required element of "force or fear" was
presented, Mr. Anderson is entitled to a reversal and a remand
for a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence.
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